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Stabilization Policies in the World Economy:
Scope and Skepticism By JEFFREY SACHS* Throughout the industrialized world, macroeconomic performance since the mid-1970's has been very poor, and the prospects in the near term remain bleak. It is sobering to reflect that all twenty-four OECD economies suffered a slowdown in aggregate economic growth after 1973 (comparing average growth rates for 1965-73 with 1973-79); all but one (Switzerland) experienced an intensification of consumer price inflation. Overall, the annual GNP growth of the OECD slowed from 4.9 percent during 1965-73 to 2.7 percent during 1973-79, and it has slowed further since then. The slow growth has translated into rising unemployment, which stood at about 7 percent of the OECD workforce in 1981 as compared with a mere 2 to 3 percent in 1970. In the European Economic Community, the 1981 unemployment rate appears to have been a staggering 8 percent.
Bright spots in this picture are few indeed, but their lessons may be instructive. After the steep recession in the OECD during 1974-75, the United States alone of the major economies staged a rapid recovery; the unemployment rate fell significantly below its 1975 peak, while it continued to rise in Europe. Unfortunately, U.S. performance on most measures has deteriorated sharply (and relatively) since 1979. Japan provides a case of extremely successful performance since the mid-1970's, after a very sharp jolt during 1973-75. Among the smaller economies, the neighboring economies of Sweden and Finland offer a vivid contrast of worsening and improving economic developments, respectively, since the mid-1970's.
There is no consensus among macroeconomists regarding the diagnosis of these ills, the sources of relative success across economies, or most important for the purpose here, the right policy mix for sustained recovery. The interpretations offered here, which must be regarded as tentative, lay great stress on the various adverse supply shocks that affected all of the OECD economies during the past decade. These interpretations are based largely on a joint research project with Michael Bruno on the macroeconomics of supply disturbances in open economies.
I. The Central Role of Supply Disturbances
The major competing schools of macroeconomic thought have focused most of their blame for the current debacle on macroeconomic policy. For the Keynesians, recent policy has been too austere, overly directed against fighting inflation. For the monetarists, the case has been almost the opposite: that politicians have continued to drive up money growth to fight short-term unemployment, to the sacrifice of longer-term price stability. And for the new classical macroeconomists, the policies have simply been too erratic, with policy " surprises" explaining the fluctuations in output growth.
Unfortunately, these important propositions have been subjected to almost no systematic, cross-country scrutiny. No strong comparative evidence has been set forth to show that high unemployment and slow growth have been closely tied to more restrictive policies, or to more uncertain and volatile policies, or that price stability has resulted from slow and stable money growth. Real wages may fail to adjust for many reasons, and each of these reasons has different implications for policy. We can divide the possible explanations into categories which emphasize: uncertainty, timing, or misperception; and union bargaining power. Most directly, some wages may be predetermined by contract at the time of an unanticipated supply disturbance, so that real wages are unexpectedly driven above fullemployment levels. If renegotiation is costless, the profit squeeze would soon disappear, but otherwise the squeeze must persist until the next bargaining round.
A related argument holds that unions, or both employers and unions, failed to understand the link of higher oil prices and wage moderation, and the ordeal of unemployment was necessary to "clarify" that link. This simple argument probably holds enormous weight. The supply shocks were a novel phenomenon. There was no way prior to the late 1970's to evaluate the partial elasticity of labor demand with respect to real energy prices, or to verify that a persistent slowdown in productivity growth had occurred. An asseveration by employers to employees of the need for real wage declines is, in general, of little avail, for employers have reason to dissimulate and employees have cause to ignore their employer's importunings. The inability of employers to convey credibly to workers the need for real wage moderation has been elegantly captured by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart. Adverse shocks in their model bump against partial real wage rigidity, and therefore cause unemployment. Their results directly transfer to our case. If this hypothesis is maintained, we should expect to see a gradual process of wage moderation after a supply shock, as workers gain evidence (through the persistence of unemployment) that the adverse demand shift against labor has in fact occurred. Moreover, we would expect learning between the first (1973-74) and second oil shocks (1979) regarding union wage setting. According to Shinkai, Japan is a vivid illustration of such learning, for formerly militant union federations explicitly called for wage moderation in 1980, in light of supplyside developments.
The previous explanations all apply in a basically competitive labor market setting. More troubling cases emerge once we recognize the extent of monopoly union power in OECD labor markets, particularly throughout Europe. In the United States, we often forget that much of European wage setting occurs in a highly centralized, highly unionized context. And when powerful unions face off against employers, supply shocks may well redound on unemployment rather than wage reductions. To our benefit, Ian McDonald and Solow have recently offered a smorgasbord of models that make that very point. There is simply no presumption that an optimizing union will substantially cut real wages, rather than employment, following a supply shock; indeed, it may even raise them!
II. Implications for Demand Management Policies in Open Economies
From the very aggregative standpoint then, supply shocks may raise the "typical" problem that the nominal price and wage are out of line with money supply and the exchange rate, and the novel case that real wages exceed their full employment level. If output markets do not clear, we may adopt Malinvaud's typology: the first problem would push the economy into the regime of Keynesian unemployment, and the latter towards classical unemployment. Demand stimulus is effective in the first case (subject to Mundell-Fleming limitations) but not in the latter, unless the demand stimulus itself (say an exchange-rate depreciation) can reduce real wages by accelerating inflation.
In recent models (particularly my 1982 article, and my 1981a article with Bruno) I have investigated these policy issues under a variety of labor market assumptions (in these models, the output market is assumed to clear continuously, so that the economy is always at the boundary of Keynesian and classical regimes). Consider one useful specification, which distinguishes between the "bargained" real wage w B, the actual real wage w, and the full-employment real wage wf (see Grubb et al. for a similar formulation). We assume that unions and firms bargain for a real wage (w B ), but set a nominal wage that is only partially indexed (or perhaps fully indexed with a lag). Actual wages (w) can deviate in the short run from wB, because of unanticipated or accelerating inflation. The bargained wage itself is assumed to respond only to unemployment, in order to capture the partial real wage rigidity discussed above. Now, we can envision various relations among wB, w, and wf Generally, unemployment will result when w> wf, but this can occur with high or low real-wage bargains. If W>Wf-WB, unions and firms would settle on a lower real wage, but because of partial nominal wage rigidity, they do not achieve it. This is a case where a money supply increase or exchange-rate devaluation can readily reduce unemployment (at the cost of a higher price level). Unemployment is basically a monetary problem.
On the other hand, if w = w B > wf, the wage bargain is intentionally set above wf, (as discussed earlier, unions may misperceive wf or may choose unemployment in return for higher wages). In this case, a monetary expansion can temporarily reduce w, and increase employment, but only in the short run. Long-run, full-employment equilibrium requires that wB be reduced to wf (or that wf be raised). For concreteness, suppose that AwB = a(U,), where U is the unemployment rate. Then, 1/a(wB -wf ) measures the cumulative unemployment that must be experienced before long-run equilibrium is restored. The unemployment may be postponed through rising inflation, but it cannot be avoided in the long run through expansionary monetary policy. Simulation exercises show that expansionary policy very often results in higher inflation and deeper unemployment along the adjustment path than does a passive policy.
It should be pointed out that a fiscal expansion may raise wf and thus moderate unemployment by favorably shifting the economy's terms of trade. Moreover, direct supply-side measures may also raise wf. Space prevents elaboration of these two possibilities here.
I close with a tale of two countries, Sweden and Finland, that vividly confirms the difficulty of preventing, rather than merely postponing, supply-shock unemployment.' Sweden utilized very expansionary policies during 1974-76 to "bridge" the world recession 
III. Conclusions and Extensions
The recessions in the 1970's were inherently more painful than previous episodes since they signalled the need for real wage moderation and a period of slow economic growth. In some countries, the need for real wage moderation was accepted by workers without the ordeal of unemployment (for example, Japan, 1979-80), while in others, the adjustment process seemed to require a recession. In such countries, expansionary demand policies serve mainly to postpone rather than prevent an economic downturn.
Of course, a variety of additional issues should be raised in a complete treatment of the recent supply shocks. Higher energy prices and competition from the NICs call for sectoral reallocation of resources, as well as overall wage and price adjustments. One suspects that in a booming economy, sectoral shifts of the requisite magnitude could be handled in stride. In the present environment, though, policymakers have supported moribund industries and protective labor legislation has slowed down the flow of workers to more productive enterprises. These inefficiencies have magnified Europe's adjustment problem significantly.
